Weighing the Aim of Belief Again

Logos and Episteme 8 (1):141-145 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In his influential discussion of the aim of belief, David Owens argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best metaphorical. In order for the ‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be weighable with other aims in deliberation, but Owens claims that this is impossible. In previous work, I have pointed out that if we look at a broader range of deliberative contexts involving belief, it becomes clear that the putative aim of belief is capable of being weighed against other aims. Recently, however, Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Paul Noordhof have objected to this response on the grounds that it employs an undefended conception of the aim of belief not shared by Owens, and that it equivocates between importantly different contexts of doxastic deliberation. In this note, I argue that both of these objections fail.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2016-09-28
Latest version: 2 (2017-03-28)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
148 ( #17,012 of 38,030 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #19,597 of 38,030 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.