Phywa pa's Argumentative Analogy Between Factive Assessment (yid dpyod) and Conceptual Thought (rtog pa)

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Abstract
This paper delves into one particular topic within this Buddhist theory of cognition. I examine a single argument by Phywa pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169) contained within his famous epistemology text, the Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel, drawing out the philosophical implications that this argument has on his theory of cognition and his account of ontological dependence. I make the case that Phywa pa’s argument fails to explain adequately the nature of the relation between certain cognitive episodes and the contents of those episodes. In addition, I will show that Phywa pa is forced to accept an arguably dubious version of externalism about mental content.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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2011-02-03

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