The Cross-Validation in the Dialogue of Mental and Neuroscience

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The aim of the Validation Theory (VT) as a meta-empirical construct is to introduce a new vista in the reorganization of the neuroscience, in its role of a science of the Mind-and-Brain unification. The present study focuses on existing discrepancies and contradictions between the methods of basic neurosciences and those prescribed by the psychological science. Our view is that these discrepancies are based on a high penetration of traditional neuroscience methods into the biological processes, coupled with low extrapolation (experimenting with animal models) and vice versa for the psychological and psychopathological methods. A novel epistemological model for integrating psychological and neuroscientific knowledge is proposed. It is represented as a simultaneous investigation of the brain activity with penetrating high resolution functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and in extenso application of set of psychological tests for exploring correspondence (cross-validation) between their compounds. The proposed approach leads to a revision of the neuroscientific and psychological terms, methods and data, followed by a revision of their relative interplay. This would make possible a practical exchange of expensive but objective fMRI with the lower costing psychological instruments (effect of "minimization"). The approaches proceeding from VT will infiltrate diagnostics and prevention in psychiatry. On a further stage the pharmaco-psychological monitoring will uncover new opportunities. This proofs' based research and practice represents an integral counterpart of the values-based mental health care. In conclusion VT is an evolutionary corner stone in order to traverse the stage of a Brain-Brain paradigm and to reach the point of development of the Mind-Brain paradigm.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
201 ( #30,021 of 2,448,820 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #48,870 of 2,448,820 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.