What You Know When You Know an Answer to a Question

Noûs 44 (2):392 - 402 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
A significant argument for the claim that knowing-wh is knowing-that, implicit in much of the literature, including Stanley and Williamson (2001), is spelt out and challenged. The argument includes the assumption that a subject's state of knowing-wh is constituted by their involvement in a relation with an answer to a question. And it involves the assumption that answers to questions are propositions or facts. One of Lawrence Powers' counterexamples to the conjunction of these two assumptions is developed, responses to it are rebutted, and the possibility of rejecting the second rather than the first of these assumptions is explored briefly
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
STOWYK-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-02-29
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Frege's Puzzle.Salmon, Nathan U.
Knowing the Answer.Schaffer, Jonathan

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Practical Know‐Wh.Farkas, Katalin

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
109 ( #24,918 of 42,417 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #38,502 of 42,417 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.