Love Without Objects


It’s a truism that love must always be for something. In technical terms, love must have an object. Yet we godless naturalists that disbelieve in all gods and any form of an afterlife, including reincarnation, must then be committed to cases of love without objects insofar as we deny the existence of objects that people genuinely love (namely, God and deceased loved ones). This commitment of ours thus seems inconsistent with the truism about love, and so it seems that we godless naturalists must reject our current beliefs and accept that God and deceased loved ones exist after all. In this paper I explain how we should understand the truism about love needing an object and how, as a result, it doesn’t actually conflict with our commitment to cases of objectless love or demonstrate that we must accept that God and deceased loved ones exist.

Author's Profile

Ryan Stringer
Lincoln Land Community College


Added to PP

89 (#58,533)

6 months
8 (#68,289)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?