Modal Humeanism and Arguments from Possibility

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):391-401 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Sider (2011, 2013) proposes a reductive analysis of metaphysical modality—‘(modal) Humeanism’—and goes on to argue that it has interesting epistemological and methodological implications. In particular, Humeanism is supposed to undermine a class of ‘arguments from possibility’, which includes Sider's (1993) own argument against mereological nihilism and Chalmers's (1996) argument against physicalism. I argue that Sider's arguments do not go through, and moreover that we should instead expect Humeanism to be compatible with the practice of arguing from possibility in philosophy

Author's Profile

Margot Strohminger
Australian Catholic University

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-27

Downloads
1,107 (#14,183)

6 months
105 (#49,767)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?