Self-Awareness: Acquaintance, Intentionality, Representation, Relation

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):311-328 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper endorses and expounds the widely held view that all experience involves pre-reflective self-consciousness or self-awareness. It argues that pre-reflective self-consciousness does not involve any sort of experience of ‘me-ness’ or ‘mine-ness’, and that all self-consciousness is essentially relational, essentially has the subject as intentional object, essentially involves representation, in particular self-representation, as well as ‘immediate acquaintance’, in particular immediate self-acquaintance; and cannot in one primordial respect involve a mistake on the part of the subject of who it is.

Author's Profile

Galen Strawson
University of Texas at Austin


Added to PP

354 (#41,248)

6 months
133 (#20,351)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?