The Bounds of freedom

In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 441-460 (2002)
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Abstract
The shortest form of the Basic Argument against free will and moral responsibility runs as follows: [1] When you act, you do what you do—in the situation in which you find yourself—because of the way you are. [2] If you do what you do because of the way you are, then in order to be fully and ultimately responsible for what you do you must be fully and ultimately responsible for the way you are. But [3] You cannot be fully and ultimately responsible for the way you are. So [4] You cannot be fully and ultimately responsible for what you do. This paper restates the Basic Argument and varies it in several different ways.
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Archival date: 2015-12-19
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Free Will and Luck.Mele, Alfred R.
The Physiognomy of Responsibility.Fischer, John Martin & Tognazzini, Neal A.

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