The buck passing account of value: assessing the negative thesis

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The buck-passing account of value involves a positive and a negative claim. The positive claim is that to be good is to have reasons for a pro-attitude. The negative claim is that goodness itself is not a reason for a pro-attitude. Unlike Scanlon, Parfit rejects the negative claim. He maintains that goodness is reason-providing, but that the reason provided is not an additional reason, additional, that is, to the reason provided by the good-making property. I consider various ways in which this may be understood and reject all of them. So I conclude that buck-passers cannot reject the negative claim.
Reprint years
2016, 2017
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-01-03
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
1,291 ( #3,522 of 65,656 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
81 ( #8,750 of 65,656 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.