Scientists are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination

Philosophy of Science:1-22 (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that present different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally epistemic consequentialists about imagination.

Author's Profile

Michael T. Stuart
University of York

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-27

Downloads
565 (#30,270)

6 months
152 (#23,215)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?