Modal Normativism on Semantic Rules

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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According to Amie Thomasson’s modal normativism, the function of modal discourse is to convey semantic rules. But what is a "semantic rule"? I raise three worries according to which there is no conception of a semantic rule that can serve the needs of a modal normativist. The first worry focuses on de re and a posteriori necessities. The second worry concerns Thomasson's inferential specification of the meaning of modal terms. The third worry asks about the normative status of semantic rules.

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Rohan Sud
Virginia Tech


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