The subjectivist consequences of expressivism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):364-387 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Jackson and Pettit argue that expressivism in metaethics collapses into subjectivism. A sincere utterer of a moral claim must believe that she has certain attitudes to be expressed. The truth-conditions of that belief then allegedly provide truth-conditions also for the moral utterance. Thus, the expressivist cannot deny that moral claims have subjectivist truth-conditions. Critics have argued that this argument fails as stated. I try to show that expressivism does have subjectivist repercussions in a way that avoids the problems of the Jackson-Pettit argument. My argument, based on the norms for asserting moral sentences, attempts to tie expressivists to a more modest form of subjectivism than the previous arguments.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SUITSC
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-06-06
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-10-01

Total views
782 ( #6,724 of 2,448,750 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #17,347 of 2,448,750 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.