Equal Moral Opportunity: A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):386-404 (2022)
Abstract
ABSTRACT Many of our common-sense moral judgments seemingly imply the existence of moral luck. I attempt to avoid moral luck while retaining most of these judgments. I defend a view on which agents have moral equality of opportunity. This allows us to account for our anti-moral-luck intuitions at less cost than has been previously recognized.
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Archival date: 2021-10-04
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2021-07-16
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122 ( #5,389 of 71,189 )
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