Equal Moral Opportunity: A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):386-404 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACT Many of our common-sense moral judgments seemingly imply the existence of moral luck. I attempt to avoid moral luck while retaining most of these judgments. I defend a view on which agents have moral equality of opportunity. This allows us to account for our anti-moral-luck intuitions at less cost than has been previously recognized.

Author's Profile

Philip Swenson
William & Mary

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-07-16

Downloads
798 (#15,243)

6 months
240 (#7,482)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?