Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)

In J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Basing Relation (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is often assumed that believing that p for a normative reason consists in nothing more than (i) believing that p for a reason and (ii) that reason’s corresponding to a normative reason to believe that p, where (i) and (ii) are independent factors. This is the Composite View. In this paper, we argue against the Composite View on extensional and theoretical grounds. We advocate an alternative that we call the Prime View. On this view, believing for a normative reason is a distinctive achievement that isn’t exhausted by the mere conjunction of (i) and (ii). Its being an achievement entails that (i) and (ii) are not independent when one believes for a normative reason: minimally, (i) must hold because (ii) holds. Apart from its intrinsic interest, our discussion has important upshots for central issues in epistemology, including the analysis of doxastic justification, the epistemology of perception, and the place of competence in epistemology.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SYLPTF
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-09-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

View all 50 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Place of Reasons in Epistemology.Sylvan, Kurt & Sosa, Ernest

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-09-21

Total views
73 ( #34,874 of 46,319 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #23,929 of 46,319 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.