The Metaphysical Status of Logic

In Michal Peliš (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2007. Filosofia (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of logic from a metaphysical point of view – what is logic grounded in and what is its relationship with metaphysics. There are three general lines that we can take. 1) Logic and metaphysics are not continuous, neither discipline has no bearing on the other one. This seems to be a rather popular approach, at least implicitly, as philosophers often skip the question altogether and go about their business, be it logic or metaphysics. However, it is not a particularly plausible view and it is very hard to maintain consistently, as we will see. 2) Logic is prior to metaphysics and has metaphysical implications. The extreme example of this kind of approach is the Dummettian one, according to which metaphysical questions are reducible to the question of which logic to adopt. 3) Metaphysics is prior to logic, and your logic should be compatible with your metaphysics. This approach suggests an answer to the question of what logic is grounded in, namely, metaphysics. Here I will defend the third option.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TAHTMS
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-02-01

Total views
552 ( #9,539 of 58,773 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #24,733 of 58,773 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.