Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction

The Monist 100 (1):120-132 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Brentano distinguishes between intentionality and reference. According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object. However, there is no mention of Brentano’s distinction between intentionality and reference in the literature. Drawing on some lesser known texts, this paper aims both at showing that Brentano makes such a distinction and at underscoring the philosophical significance of his position.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TAIIAR
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-05-22
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-03-16

Total views
57 ( #44,760 of 54,384 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #38,294 of 54,384 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.