The Rotten Core of Presentism

Synthese 199 (1-2):3969-3991 (2021)
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Abstract

Recently, some have attempted to reformulate debates in first-order metaphysics, particularly in the metaphysics of time and modality, for reasons due to Williamson. In this paper, we focus on the ways in which the likes of Cameron, Correia and Rosenkranz, Deasy, Ingram, Tallant, Viebahn, inter alia, have initiated and responded to attempts to capture the core of presentism using a formal, logical machinery. We argue that such attempts are doomed to fail because there is no theoretical core to presentism. There is no single view or family of views that is presentism.

Author Profiles

David Ingram
University of York
Jonathan Tallant
Nottingham University

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