Mennyire lehet nehéz? A túlzott követelések ellenvetésének újszerű megközelítései (‘How Hard Can It Get? Novel Approaches to the Overdemandingness Objection’)

Cafe Babel:39-48 (2013)
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The paper begins with a detailed discussion of the Overdemandingness Objection to consequentialism. It argues that the best interpretation of the Objection is the one that focuses on reasons: consequentialism is overdemanding because it demands us, with decisive force, to do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to do. After this, the paper goes on to offer three – so far in the literature unpursued – responses to the Objection. The first puts forward a constitutive role of instutions in determining and, in face of the Objection, lowering the demands of consequentialism; the second argues that consequentialism does not give us decisive reasons to act; the third doubts that the intuition that consequentialist requirements lack decisive force, does in fact exists.
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