On Nāgārjuna's Ontological and Semantic Paradox

Philosophy East and West 66 (4):1292-1306 (2016)
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In one of his key texts, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna famously sets out to refute the ontology of essence.1 He presents numerous arguments to show that things don’t exist essentially—that is, that things are empty of essence or inherent existence. The doctrine of emptiness has been variously understood by traditional and contemporary commentators. Most radical is the recent interpretation presented by Garfield and Priest. They have rationally reconstructed Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness as an endorsement of the contradictory nature of reality. According to them, Nāgārjuna can be seen to be arguing that the way in which things exist in reality and what we can truly say about them must be...
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Nagarjuna and the Limits of Thought.Garfield, Jay L. & Priest, Graham
How We Think Mādhyamikas Think: A Response To Tom Tillemans.Deguchi, Yasuo; Garfield, Jay L. & Priest, Graham

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