On Nāgārjuna's Ontological and Semantic Paradox

Philosophy East and West 66 (4):1292-1306 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In one of his key texts, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna famously sets out to refute the ontology of essence.1 He presents numerous arguments to show that things don’t exist essentially—that is, that things are empty of essence or inherent existence. The doctrine of emptiness has been variously understood by traditional and contemporary commentators. Most radical is the recent interpretation presented by Garfield and Priest. They have rationally reconstructed Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness as an endorsement of the contradictory nature of reality. According to them, Nāgārjuna can be seen to be arguing that the way in which things exist in reality and what we can truly say about them must be...
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TANONO
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-09-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-10-15

Total views
66 ( #26,364 of 38,085 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #14,697 of 38,085 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.