Reliabilism and imprecise credences

Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1463-1480 (2021)
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What is it for an imprecise credence to be justified? It might be thought that this is not a particularly urgent question for friends of imprecise credences to answer. For one might think that its answer just depends on how a well-trodden issue in epistemology plays out—namely, that of which theory of doxastic justification, be it reliabilism, evidentialism, or some other theory, is correct. I’ll argue, however, that it’s difficult for reliabilists to accommodate imprecise credences, at least if we understand such credences to be determinate first-order attitudes. If I’m right, reliabilists will have to reject imprecise credences, and friends of imprecise credences will have to reject reliabilism. Near the end of the paper, I’ll also consider whether reliabilism can accommodate indeterminate credences.
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First archival date: 2020-06-22
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