Emotions and the intelligibility of akratic action

In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 97--120 (2003)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
After discussing de Sousa's view of emotion in akrasia, I suggest that emotions be viewed as nonconceptual perceptions of value (see Tappolet 2000). It follows that they can render intelligible actions which are contrary to one's better judgment. An emotion can make one's action intelligible even when that action is opposed by one's all-things-considered judgment. Moreover, an akratic action prompted by an emotion may be more rational than following one's better judgement, for it may be the judgement and not the perception which is in error. By contrast, "cool" akrasia is genuinely puzzling; it is not clear whether it exists.
Keywords
Reprint years
2005, 2007
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TAPEAT
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Extended Emotion.Carter, J. Adam; Gordon, Emma C. & Palermos, S. Orestis

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
514 ( #5,755 of 42,944 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #12,078 of 42,944 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.