Wiedza bezpośrednia a przejrzystość introspekcji

Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 124:279-297 (2022)
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Abstract

In a few short paragraphs of The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell presents his theory of introspective knowledge based on the concept of knowledge by acquaintance. In this article, I critically analyze these comments by Russell and their proposed application by contemporary authors, including Brie Gertler (2001; 2011) and Laurence BonJour (2003). I show how these theories differ from the competing ‘inner‑sense theories’ and try to show that they are inconsistent with Gareth Evans’s ‘transparency’ observation. Then I compare acquaintance theories with Alex Byrne’s (2005; 2012) ‘transparency’ theory and show that Byrne’s theory offers a simpler account of mechanisms governing introspection and attribution of mental states to other agents. The AAM version available on PhilPapers iis licensed under CC BY 4.0.

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Maciej Tarnowski
University of Warsaw

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