Market Freedom as Antipower

American Political Science Review 107 (3):593-602 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Historically, republicans were of different minds about markets: some, such as Rousseau, reviled them, while others, like Adam Smith, praised them. The recent republican resurgence has revived this issue. Classical liberals such as Gerald Gaus contend that neo-republicanism is inherently hostile to markets, while neo-republicans like Richard Dagger and Philip Pettit reject this characterization—though with less enthusiasm than one might expect. I argue here that the right republican attitude toward competitive markets is celebratory rather than acquiescent and that republicanism demands such markets for the same reason it requires the rule of law: because both are essential institutions for protecting individuals from arbitrary interference. I reveal how competition restrains—and in the limit, even eradicates—market power and thereby helps us realize “market freedom,” i.e., freedom as non-domination in the context of economic exchange. Finally, I show that such freedom necessitates “Anglo-Nordic” economic policies.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TAYMFA
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 3 (2015-11-21)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-03-23

Total views
914 ( #4,560 of 58,375 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
71 ( #9,789 of 58,375 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.