Rawls's Conception of Autonomy

In Ben Colburn (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 96-109 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter sets out John Rawls’s conception of autonomy and considers the role that it plays in his thought across A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. I suggest that one distinctive but overlooked feature of this conception is that it takes seriously the threat to autonomy that arises from how individuals are shaped by their social and political institutions. After setting out this conception and tracing its connections to wider discussions of autonomy, I argue for two main conclusions. First, that despite appearances to the contrary, Rawls’s autonomy-based commitments are broadly speaking consistent across his two main works. Second, that these autonomy-based commitments are not in fact disbarred from playing a grounding role in Political Liberalism. On the contrary, I suggest that Rawls’s conception of autonomy motivates his aim of finding principles of justice that can be stable, and that this in turn illuminates his later commitment to a political liberalism.

Author's Profile

Anthony Taylor
Université de Fribourg

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-09-01

Downloads
1,143 (#9,495)

6 months
375 (#4,313)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?