"Ought" and Error

Journal of Philosophy 117 (2):96-114 (2020)
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Abstract
The moral error theory generally does not receive good press in metaethics. This paper adds to the bad news. In contrast to other critics, though, I do not attack error theorists’ characteristic thesis that no moral assertion is ever true. Instead, I develop a new counter-argument which questions error theorists’ ability to defend their claim that moral utterances are meaningful assertions. More precisely: Moral error theorists lack a convincing account of the meaning of deontic moral assertions, or so I will argue.
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TIEOAE-2
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Archival date: 2019-11-05
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2019-11-05

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