Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question “why be moral?”

Synthese 161 (2):309 - 323 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I challenge a familiar argument -- a composite of arguments in the literature -- for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. The work I devote to those topics shows not only that the argument I address is unsound, but that the conclusion of that argument is false. “Why be moral?” is no pseudo-question.

Author's Profile

John J. Tilley
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
925 (#16,131)

6 months
89 (#60,190)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?