Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question “why be moral?”

Synthese 161 (2):309 - 323 (2008)
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Abstract
In this paper, I challenge a familiar argument -- a composite of arguments in the literature -- for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. The work I devote to those topics shows not only that the argument I address is unsound, but that the conclusion of that argument is false. “Why be moral?” is no pseudo-question.
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References found in this work BETA
Moral Realism: A Defence.Shafer-Landau, Russ
The Sources of Normativity.Korsgaard, Christine M.
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
Morals by Agreement.Gauthier, David

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