The Problem of Inconsistency in Wollaston's Moral Theory

History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (3):265–80 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper challenges Francis Hutcheson's and John Clarke of Hull's alleged demonstrations that William Wollaston's moral theory is inconsistent. It also present a form of the inconsistency objection that fares better than theirs, namely, that of Thomas Bott (1688-1754). Ultimately, the paper shows that Wollaston's moral standard is not what some have thought it to be; that consequently, his philosophy withstands the best-known efforts to expose it as inconsistent; and further, that one of the least-known British moralists is more important than hitherto thought, in that he uncovers the inconsistency Clarke and Hutcheson try in vain to elicit.

Author's Profile

John J. Tilley
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis


Added to PP

644 (#25,957)

6 months
94 (#53,068)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?