Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):672-686 (2016)
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Abstract
Do facts about what an agent would freely do in certain circumstances at least partly determine any of her moral obligations? Actualists answer ‘yes’, while possibilists answer ‘no’. We defend two novel hybrid accounts that are alternatives to actualism and possibilism: Dual Obligations Hybridism and Single Obligation Hybridism. By positing two moral ‘oughts’, each account retains the benefits of actualism and possibilism, yet is immune from the prima facie problems that face actualism and possibilism. We conclude by highlighting one substantive difference between our two hybrid accounts.
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Archival date: 2018-07-03
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