Coin flips, credences and the Reflection Principle

Analysis 72 (3):478-488 (2012)
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One recent topic of debate in Bayesian epistemology has been the question of whether imprecise credences can be rational. I argue that one account of imprecise credences, the orthodox treatment as defended by James M. Joyce, is untenable. Despite Joyce’s claims to the contrary, a puzzle introduced by Roger White shows that the orthodox account, when paired with Bas C. van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle, can lead to inconsistent beliefs. Proponents of imprecise credences, then, must either provide a compelling reason to reject Reflection or admit that the rational credences in White’s case are precise.
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Distorted Reflection.Briggs, Rachael

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Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation.Bradley, Seamus & Steele, Katie Siobhan

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