Centered assertion
Philosophical Studies 150 (1):97-114 (2010)
Abstract
I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11098-009-9399-1
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Added to PP
2009-04-04
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13 (#62,995)
2009-04-04
Downloads
301 (#29,845)
6 months
13 (#62,995)
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