Flow Fragmentalism

Theoria 85 (3):185-201 (2019)
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Abstract
In this paper, we articulate a version of non-standard A-theory – which we call Flow Fragmentalism – in relation to its take on the issue of supervenience of truth on being. According to the Truth Supervenes on Being (TSB) Principle, the truth of past- and future-tensed propositions supervenes, respectively, on past and future facts. Since the standard presentist denies the existence of past and future entities and facts concerning them that do not obtain in the present, she seems to lack the resources to accept both past and future-tensed truths and the TSB Principle. Contrariwise, positions in philosophy of time that accept an eternalist ontology (e.g., B-theory, moving spotlight, and Fine’s and Lipman’s versions of fragmentalism) allow for a “direct” supervenience base for past- and future-tensed truths. We argue that Flow Fragmentalism constitutes a middle ground, which retains most of the advantages of both views, and allows us to articulate a novel account of the passage of time.
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Archival date: 2019-01-09
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References found in this work BETA
The Unreality of Time.J. Ellis McTaggart - 1908 - Mind 17 (68):457-474.
Nefarious Presentism.Tallant, Jonathan & Ingram, David
Appendix.Yablo, Stephen

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