Sobre la existencia de las percepciones en el pensamiento de Hume

In Grobet Benítez & Luis Ramos-Alarcon (eds.), El concepto de substancia de Spinoza a Hegel. Ciudad de México, CDMX, México: pp. 267-288 (2018)
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Abstract
In this paper I try to understand David Hume’s theory of the ideas as an alternative ontology. I assume that David Hume seeks to establish a criterion of human knowledge and moral behavior by thinking the fundamental concepts from philosophical tradition, such as substance and personal identity or subjectivity, and turning between the denial and the affirmation of them. In this sense, the criticism of the metaphysical tradition, to which some interpreters reduce his theory, and the alternative ontology which we purpose here, have to promote a middle ground between common sense and philosophical meaning of life, truth and morality. In the development of this interpretation the classifi cations perceptions are exposed, being independent existences and the basis of Hume’s epistemology. Subsequently, the elements of an intermittent subjectivity that can be derived from them are exposed. Finally, we consider the figments of the imagination, being the latter, rather than a power of representation among others, a substance between substances.
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Archival date: 2018-11-17
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