Vague Existence

In Dean Zimmerman & Karen Bennett (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol. 10. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-234 (2017)
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Ted Sider has famously argued that existence, in the unrestricted sense of ontology, cannot be vague, as long as vagueness is modeled by means of precisifications. The first section of Chapter 9 exposes some controversial assumptions underlying Sider’s alleged reductio of vague existence. The upshot of the discussion is that, although existence cannot be vague, it can be super-vague, i.e. higher-order vague, for all orders. The second section develops and defends a novel framework, dubbed negative supervaluationary semantics, which makes room for the possibility of super-vague existence.

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Alessandro Torza
National Autonomous University of Mexico


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