The Possibility of a Fair Play Account of Legitimacy

Ratio 30 (1):88-99 (2017)
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Abstract
The philosophical literature on state legitimacy has recently seen a significant conceptual revision. Several philosophers have argued that the state's right to rule is better characterized not as a claim right to obedience, but as a power right. There have been few attempts to show that traditional justifications for the claim right might also be used to justify a power right, and there have been no such attempts involving the principle of fair play, which is widely regarded as the most promising basis for a claim right to obedience. William Edmundson argues that the principle of fair play cannot generate power rights, and so any attempt at a fair play account of legitimacy must fail. I explain how fair play could generate a power right, owing to its stipulation that the rules of a cooperative scheme specify the form of participants' repayment.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 1 (2017-02-09)
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References found in this work BETA
Law's Empire.DWORKIN, R.
The Concept of Law.Hart, H. L. A.
The Realm of Rights.Thomson, Judith Jarvis

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2015-07-07

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