Compositionality and modest inferentialism

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This paper provides both a solution and a problem for the account of compositionality in Christopher Peacocke’s modest inferentialism. The immediate issue facing Peacocke’s account is that it looks as if compositionality can only be understood at the level of semantics, which is difficult to reconcile with inferentialism. Here, following up a brief suggestion by Peacocke, I provide a formal framework wherein compositionality occurs the level of the determining relation between inference and semantics. This, in turn provides a “test” for compositionality, which, problematically, Peacocke’s natural deduction framework for classical logic can not meet. To finish, I briefly outline an alternative, bilateralist, framework for modest inferentialism, for which compositionality holds
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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The Connectives.Humberstone, Lloyd
The Connectives.Humberstone, Ian
Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role.Fodor, Jerry A. & Lepore, Ernest

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