Truth and epistemic value

European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1057-1068 (2018)
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Abstract
The notion of more truth, or of more truth and less falsehood, is central to epistemology. Yet, I argue, we have no idea what this consists in, as the most natural or obvious thing to say—that more truth is a matter of a greater number of truths, and less falsehood is a matter of a lesser number of falsehoods—is ultimately implausible. The issue is important not merely because the notion of more truth and less falsehood is central to epistemology, but because an implicit, false picture of what this consists in underpins and gives shape to much contemporary epistemology.
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Archival date: 2018-03-20
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