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Trivial Truths and the Aim of Inquiry
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):552-559 (2012)
Abstract
A pervasive and influential argument appeals to trivial truths to demonstrate that the aim of inquiry is not the acquisition of truth. But the argument fails, for it neglects to distinguish between the complexity of the sentence used to express a truth and the complexity of the truth expressed by a sentence.Author's Profile
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2012-07-26
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2012-07-26
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