Inheritance Arguments for Fundamentality

In Ricki Leigh Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.), Reality and its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
According to metaphysical foundationalism, it’s necessary that any non-fundamental entity be fully grounded by fundamental entities. Jonathan Schaffer has recently proposed an argument for metaphysical foundationalism that appeals to the notion of reality inheritance. After clarifying the argument, I argue that it is unsuccessful. Then I suggest that there are more plausible arguments that appeal to the notion of causal capacity inheritance instead. But, as these arguments target special cases of metaphysical foundationalism, I conclude that if considerations involving inheritance are to provide a route to metaphysical foundationalism, the route will be indirect.
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First archival date: 2016-02-19
Latest version: 2 (2017-12-30)
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Deep Platonism.Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):307-328.

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