Intrinsicality for Monists (and Pluralists)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):555-558 (2010)
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Two competing views in sparse ontology are monism and pluralism. In Trogdon 2009 I propose an account of intrinsicality that I argue is both compatible with monism and pluralism and independently plausible. Skiles 2009 argues that my account fails on both fronts. In this note I respond to his two objections
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Defining 'Intrinsic'.Langton, Rae & Lewis, David

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Counterpossibles.Krakauer, Barak

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