Intrinsicality for Monists (and Pluralists)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):555-558 (2010)
Abstract
Two competing views in sparse ontology are monism and pluralism. In Trogdon 2009 I propose an account of intrinsicality that I argue is both compatible with monism and pluralism and independently plausible. Skiles 2009 argues that my account fails on both fronts. In this note I respond to his two objections
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References found in this work BETA
Maximality and Intrinsic Properties.Sider, Theodore
Monism and Intrinsicality.Trogdon, Kelly
Intrinsic Properties and Natural Relations.Hawthorne, John
Contemporary Metaphysics: An Introduction.Jubien, Michael
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Citations of this work BETA
Monism, Emergence, and Plural Logic.Bohn, Einar Duenger
Analyses of Intrinsicality Without Naturalness.Marshall, Daniel Graham
Counterpossibles.Krakauer, Barak
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2009-08-07
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460 ( #5,833 of 40,046 )
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58 ( #8,488 of 40,046 )
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