Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification

In Michael Bergmann & Brett Coppenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 43-60 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Classical acquaintance theory is any version of classical foundationalism that appeals to acquaintance in order to account for non-inferential justification. Such theories are well suited to account for a kind of infallible non-inferential justification. Why am I justified in believing that I’m in pain? An initially attractive (partial) answer is that I’m acquainted with my pain. But since I can’t be acquainted with what isn’t there, acquaintance with my pain guarantees that I’m in pain. What’s less clear is whether, given classical acquaintance theory, it’s possible to have non-inferential justification to believe something false. Classical acquaintance theorists try to make room for such a possibility, but I argue that the attempts of Richard Fumerton, Ali Hasan, and Evan Fales are inadequate. I’ll focus on introspective justification, but similar issues arise for a priori justification as well.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TUCAAF
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
The Incoherence of Empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge, Infallibility, and Skepticism.Stoutenburg, Gregory Douglas

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-07-11

Total views
623 ( #5,812 of 48,837 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
59 ( #10,776 of 48,837 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.