Divine Satisficing and the Ethics of the Problem of Evil

Faith and Philosophy 37 (1):32-56 (2020)
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This paper accomplishes three goals. First, it reveals that God’s ethics has a radical satisficing structure: God can choose a good enough suboptimal option even if there is a best option and no countervailing considerations. Second, it resolves the long-standing worry that there is no account of the good enough that is both principled and demanding enough to be good enough. Third, it vindicates the key ethical assumption in the problem of evil without relying on the contested assumption that God’s ethics is our ethics.

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Chris Tucker
William & Mary


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