Experience as Evidence

In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge (forthcoming)
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Abstract
This chapter explores whether and when experience can be evidence. It argues that experiences can be evidence, and that this claim is compatible with just about any epistemological theory. It evaluates the most promising argument for the conclusion that certain experiences (e.g., seeming to see) are always evidence for believing what the experiences represent. While the argument is very promising, one premise needs further defense. The argument also depends on a certain connection between reasonable belief and the first person perspective.
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Archival date: 2019-08-08
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