An Infinitist Account of Doxastic Justification
Dialectica 63 (2):209-218 (2009)
Abstract
Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Can infinitism account for it? Proposals to date have been unsatisfactory. This paper advances a new infinitist account of the distinction. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets the stage. Section 2 presents Peter Klein's account. Section 3 raises a problem for Klein's account and suggests an improvement. Section 4 raises a further challenge. Sections 5 to 7 consider several unsuccessful attempts to meet the challenge. Section 8 presents my new proposal, which can meet the challenge. Section 9 concludes the discussion.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TURAIA-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-06-30
View other versions
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-02-22
Total views
210 ( #34,137 of 70,089 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #43,250 of 70,089 )
2017-02-22
Total views
210 ( #34,137 of 70,089 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #43,250 of 70,089 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.