Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):212-222 (2016)
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Researchers recently demonstrated a strong direct relationship between judgments about what a person knows and judgments about how a person should act. But it remains unknown whether actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments, or knowledge judgments cause actionability judgments. This paper uses causal modeling to help answer this question. Across two experiments, we found evidence that actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments.

Author Profiles

David Rose
Stanford University
John Turri
University of Waterloo
Wesley Buckwalter
George Mason University


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