Back to the Future: Curing Past Sufferings and S-Risks via Indexical Uncertainty

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Abstract
The long unbearable sufferings in the past and agonies experienced in some future timelines in which a malevolent AI could torture people for some idiosyncratic reasons (s-risks) is a significant moral problem. Such events either already happened or will happen in causally disconnected regions of the multiverse and thus it seems unlikely that we can do anything about it. However, at least one pure theoretic way to cure past sufferings exists. If we assume that there is no stable substrate of personal identity and thus a copy equals original, then by creating many copies of the next observer-moment of a person in pain in which he stops suffer, we could create indexical uncertainty in her future location and thus effectively steal her consciousness from her initial location and immediately relieve her sufferings. However, to accomplish this for people who have already died, we need to perform this operation for all possible people thus requiring enormous amounts of computations. Such computation could be performed by the future benevolent AI of Galactic scale. Many such AIs could cooperate acausally by distributing parts of the work between them via quantum randomness. To ensure their success, they need to outnumber all possible evil AIs by orders of magnitude, and thus they need to convert most of the available matter into computronium in all universes where they exist and cooperate acausally across the whole multiverse. Another option for curing past suffering is the use of wormhole time-travel to send a nanobot in the past which will, after a period of secret replication, collect the data about people and secretly upload them when their suffering becomes unbearable.
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First archival date: 2020-12-15
Latest version: 2 (2020-12-16)
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2020-12-15

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