Contingent A Priori Knowledge
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344 (2011)
Abstract
I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary
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0031-8205
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TURCAP
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2009-08-01
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95 ( #7,381 of 68,971 )
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