Contingent A Priori Knowledge

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Abstract
I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary
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0031-8205
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TURCAP
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Archival date: 2020-06-30
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2009-08-01

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