On the regress argument for infinitism

Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163 (2009)
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Abstract
This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.
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2009
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Archival date: 2020-07-02
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2009-01-28

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