Fictional Modality and the Intensionality of Fictional Contexts

Australasian Journal of Logic 19 (4):124-132 (2022)
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In, Kosterec attempts to provide ``model-theoretic proofs'' of certain theses involving the normal modal operators $\Diamond$ and $\square$ and the truth-in-fiction operator $F$ which he then goes on to show have counterexamples in Kripke models. He concludes from this that the embedding of modal logic under the truth-in-fiction operator is unsound. We show instead that it is the ``model-theoretic proofs'' that are themselves unsound, involving illicit substitution, a subtle error that nevertheless allows us to draw an important conclusion about intensional contexts and semantic equivalences.

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Sara L. Uckelman
Durham University


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