Yes to realism! No to nonnaturalism!

Kritike 3 (1):168-177 (2009)
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Abstract
I evaluate the metaphysical plausibility of the non-naturalist view of moral properties. I will mainly concentrate my evaluation on the views of Shafer-Landau (henceforth just S-L) whose defence of moral non-naturalism is the most lucid and vigorous so far. I shall try to show its metaphysical problems and defend Jackson’s Occamist naturalism about moral properties which I consider to be more consistent with the supervenience platitude.
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