Confusion is Corruptive Belief in False Identity

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):204-227 (2016)
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Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication

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Elmar Unnsteinsson
University College Dublin


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